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Abstract—Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs) has emerged
as a unique implementation of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
(MANETs). These networks promise to increase road safety and
improve the driving experience by exploiting recent advances in
wireless technologies for both intra-vehicle and inter-vehicle com-
munications. Physical layer security is a promising alternative
approach to secure communication in VANETs where physical
and applications’ constraints encourage the use of lightweight
and fast cryptographic algorithms. Our work focuses on the
quantisation stage of the secret generation process, by reviewing
existing schemes in the public domain and associated perfor-
mance metrics. Evaluations are done through simulation with the
aid of a wireless channel model which includes three-dimensional
scattering and scatterers’ mobility. Preliminary findings show
that RSS-based algorithms do not perform efficiently in the
proposed vehicular stochastic wireless model. Hence they are
not able to satisfy the typical low latency required in safety-
related broadcasting messaging. We conclude that more research
is desirable to design protocols capable of taking advantage from
the nodes’ high-mobility and the consequent variability of both
coherence intervals and level crossing rates, to further improve
secret bit extraction throughput.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, Secret bit extraction,
Key Generation Rate, Vehicle Ad-hoc Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
ROAD-safety plays a key role in all societies, especiallyin developing countries where the transport system is
continuously changing to support expanding cities. In low and
medium income countries Global Health Observatory (WHO)
anticipated that by 2017 the vast majority of people will be
living in urban areas, pushing towards a rapid yet disorganised
increase in transport infrastructures often resulting in a drastic
reduction of road-users safety [1]. For example, in Brazil,
about 30.000 people die in road accidents every year where
in South Africa the incidence of this event happening is even
higher. Most of these accidents could have been avoided if
the driver had been alerted in time [2]. Intelligent Transport
System (ITS), born from the synergy among transport engi-
neering, informatics, electronics and communication networks,
aims to simultaneously increase transport-safety, quality and
efficiency and decrease environmental impact. Furthermore,
these objectives are not entirely disjunct, but often causally
interconnected and interrelated, as in the reduction of road
accidents which would imply a subsequent decrease in traffic-
jams and hence a reduction of pollution from fumes [3].
A fundamental concept underlying ITS is the intercon-
nection and communication of both transport entities and
road-side infrastructures through Vehicle Ad-hoc Networks
(VANETs), where nodes collaborate to spread vital messages,
navigation-related information, internet access and other info-
tainment data. The large variety of applications and services,
the high number of user and the heterogeneous set of circulat-
ing data render the VANETs possible and desirable targets of
many attacks, encouraging the design of architectures imbued
of security considerations [4] [5] [6].
The establishment of secure communications requires,
among other properties, the presence of an authentication
mechanism, with which nodes could identify themselves as
vehicles or road-side units. The integrity of the messages
needs to be maintained through all the transmission life-cycle
against voluntary (made by unauthorised entities) or invol-
untary alterations (deterioration), guaranteeing the validity of
their contents, which must not be available or disclosed to
illegitimate parties, preserving confidentiality.
The realisation of a complete security scheme, which fulfils
the specific requirements of VANETs, is still under inves-
tigation by researchers. Currently proposed approaches rely
on the use of public key infrastructure (PKI) where RSA
and Diffie-Hellman schemes are the typical choices. These,
however, require a significant amount of channel capacity
and computational capabilities which may not be available
in VANETs, which significantly reduce the overall network
performance. On the other hand, symmetric cryptography
achieves high security together with high-speed processing and
ease of implementation [7]. Unfortunately, the fundamental
task of sharing the secret key between the legitimate parties
must be addressed, eventually worsened by the continuously
connecting-disconnecting nature of this kind of networks.
Surprisingly, the wireless medium provides a unique source
of randomness that can be ’digested’ to generate secure keys.
The wireless signal is often subjected to intense reflection and
diffraction that creates multipath propagation phenomena [8],
[9], [10]. Changes in the transmitters and receivers’ positions
and velocity of intermediate objects significantly influence the
resulting signal, due to the sum of different phases coming
from different paths.
Even if multipath variability is considered as a stochastic
process, the channel reciprocity principle [11] guarantees that
its effects are almost identical for both communicating parties,
a correlation which rapidly vanishes with time and at a
distance in the order of half a wavelength [12]. Physical layer
(PHY) security protocols simultaneously exploit such a corre-
lation and time-spatial variabilities to extract and share secure
keys with low computational complexity, low bandwidth usage
and provide unconditionally secure communications [13].
VANETs expose a continuously changing nature which
constitutes a fertile ground for physical layer security proto-
cols. However, despite the high number of schemes available
in the literature, their application in real-world scenarios is
limited. In [14] researchers adapt accordingly their previously
proposed physical-layer-security scheme [15] and offer two
different algorithms for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-
to-infrastructure (V2I) communications, based on reciprocity
and diversity theorems, respectively. They do not seem to
consider the challenging time constraints of VANETs appli-
cations, which are further analysed in [16]. Researchers also
propose to use slow fading (i.e., log-normal-modelled spatial
variations) along with fast fading (i.e., Rayleigh-modelled
temporal variations) when the transmitter and receiver’s speed
difference is negligible.
None of the previous schemes considers the presence and
the possible interactions among vehicles and intermediate
objects. Work in [17] incorporates three-dimensional scattering
and scatterers’ mobility to obtain a more realistic system
model and corresponding simulation [18]. The application of
a non-reciprocity compensation technique in conjunction with
an information reconciliation phase based on turbo codes,
record a significant improvement in both key generation rate
and bit mismatch rate (defined in Section 3). Besides the im-
provements towards more accurate VANETs models, previous
schemes rely on a standard lossy quantisation approach, where
the choice of the thresholds is made in a context-unaware way.
This work compares and contrasts existing quantisation
schemes for secret key generation when applied in vehicular
networks. Performances are evaluated through extensive sim-
ulations in a stochastic wireless model which includes three-
dimensional scattering and scatterers’ mobility [18], in order
to analyse the feasibility of physical security protocols in a
urban high-trafficked scenarios.
The paper is structured with introduction above followed by
Section 2 which gives a brief overview of VANETs’ security
constraints and reviews existing literature on physical secret
key generation focusing on quantisation aspects. Section 3
introduces the fundamental performance metrics to be used
in our work. Section 4 presents the V-V channel model, its
simulation parameters and analyses the results. Finally, Section
5 concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
Vehicle Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) are a subclass of
Mobile Ad-hoc Networks (MANETs) in which vehicles and
road infrastructures collaborate through dedicated short-range
communications (DSRC). Two types of radio apparatus repre-
sent the node in a VANET: vehicles’ on-board-units (OBUs)
and road-side units (RSUs). Besides supplying the ability to
connect to the wireless medium, OBUs and RSUs also have to
implement several aspects regarding security. These aspects in-
clude protection of sensible data, drivers’ identity and vehicles’
kinematic data in tamper-proof devices (TPDs) and providing
fundamental cryptographic abilities through mixed hardware
and software trusted platform modules (TPMs) [6].
Even if the term ad-hoc usually refers to networks with
specialised unicast routing algorithms, in the specific case
of VANETs, the ”ad-hoc” concept assumes a broader sense
which indicates a decentralised network, built on no pre-
existing infrastructures with routing determined only by the
current connectivity and topology. Furthermore, broadcasting
techniques are more suitable for critical messages, which are
emitted in a periodic or event-driven fashion in safety-related
applications [19] to reduce accidents, as the implementation
of the cooperative forward collision warning.
The absence of a central coordinator and the necessity of
broadcasting both justify the creation of a control channel
(CC), as well as the rising importance of PHY/MAC layers.
The current focus is on the IEEE 802.11 family of standards
in which the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM) and IEEE modified the WLAN IEEE 802.11a stan-
dard obtaining the new IEEE 802.11p (WAVE) to support
vehicular wireless communications and Intelligent Transport
System’s services. This new standard is based on orthogo-
nal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), a CSMA-based
scheme and a bandwidth of 10MHz (down from 20MHz of
IEEE 802.11a) centred at 5.9GHz, resulting in a channel
capacity in the range 3-27 Mb/s [20].
In [21] scientists analyse how different factors concur on
the probability of receiving packets and state that it is better
to renounce high-speed data rates, to maximise the packet-
capture capabilities. A MAC layer based on enhanced dis-
tributed channel access (EDCA) has been proposed to increase
reception probabilities of high-priority packets. However, the
current standard IEEE 802.11p seems to be quite limited for
the ITS services to rely upon. For a full survey on VANETs
challenges and vulnerabilities, the reader is encouraged to refer
to [6] [22] [5].
Besides the limited data-rate, the main characteristic of
VANETs is their high mobility and continuously changing
topology due to the random speed of nodes and their frequent
disconnection. Volatile and short-life communications harden
the task of securing the wireless link and simultaneously
dispatching alert messages in the pre-established delay. For
instance, safety-related messages require a minimum transmis-
sion frequency of 10Hz with a maximum latency of 100ms
[23]. Furthermore, in [24] authors analyse the relationship
between data-packet sizes and communication efficiency in
VANETs, concluding that small packets achieve better trans-
mission rate.
Security approaches have to take into account previous
constraints, aiming to design light-weighted protocols with
both low transmission overhead and high-speed processing.
A viable path consists of the use of symmetric cryptography
together with a PHY key generation scheme, providing both
faster encryption-decryption and a continuous refreshment of
secret keys which need not be exchanged.
A. The secret key generation process
In its simplest form, in physical layer security, the secret
key is generated through a three-step process: advantage dis-
tillation, information reconciliation and privacy amplification.
The first block [25], [26] extracts mutual information be-
tween legitimate parties Alice and Bob through an interleaved
exchange of probes. The duration of the probing phase is
proportional to the desired key length, while the probing fre-
quency depends on the dynamic characteristics of the channel.
To collect correlated estimates Alice and Bob must collect
their measurements inside the coherence time Tc of the
channel that represents the time duration over which the
channel impulse response is considered as not changing. In
wireless medium the coherence time is strictly connected to
Doppler effects due to nodes’ movements [27]. Specifically,
the coherence interval is the time domain dual of the maximum
Doppler frequency fm, hence Tc ≈ 1/fm. A fast probing
rate will quickly result in redundant estimates which are not
suitable for the generation of a key and must be re-sampled
to extract a distinct measurement for each coherence time.
Even at the fastest probing frequency, the half-duplex limi-
tation of the wireless channel does not allow nodes to acquire
beacons simultaneously, and the positive delay induces (small)
asymmetries at the received signals triggered by the white
nature of the noise. In a very few cases, these asymmetries
are addressed by preventive and compensation techniques such
as an interpolation based on Cubic Farrow filters [28] [29]
or an application of low pass filters [30] [31] [32] [33].
However, in the vast majority of protocols, differences due
imperfect reciprocity are left untouched until the information
reconciliation step, explained hereafter.
The core of the distillation stage is the quantisation step
where channel’s estimates are converted into binary strings.
Quantisation plays a primary role in the entire extraction
process because its output has the potential of becoming a
shared secret key and its performance dramatically influences
the overall efficiency of the protocol and its applicability in
real-world scenarios. Unfortunately, every quantisation scheme
should be designed by considering three contrasting metrics,
which are the Bit Mismatch Rate (BMR), the Bit Generation
Rate (BGR) and key robustness, in the challenging effort to
simultaneously minimise the first one, while increasing as
much as possible the others.
Quantisation schemes are said to be lossless if they can
generate at least one bit for each estimate, for example using
a single threshold. On the other hand, conversion algorithms
may choose to drop values to both decreases the disagree-
ment probability as well as maximise the generated sequence
entropy, referred to as lossy or censor schemes.
Following quantisation, bit-streams enter into an informa-
tion reconciliation block which has the duty of compensating
imperfect reciprocity and correcting any key disagreement
between communicating nodes. Its implementation varies from
error correction codes to fuzzy information reconciliation
techniques [34] with the aid of a public channel. A widely
used approach, called CASCADE, was proposed in [35]
in which disagreements are resolved through iterative parity-
based correction codes calculated on randomly permuted bit
sequences. Other works tried to both improve reconciliation
capabilities and reduce the information leakage during the
public discussion [36] [37].
After the information reconciliation step, Alice and Bob’s
bit-streams should be identical otherwise the key generation
process is restarted. These sequences, however, are not yet
ready to be used as a key because they still contain information
used in their creation. The step of privacy amplification
sacrifice part of the key to elevating its entropy, as in the
application of a universal hash function [38].
B. Quantisation schemes
Quantisation schemes are strongly linked to the channel
characteristics, used as sources of randomness for secret keys
generation. Received Signal Strength (RSS), Channel Impulse
Response (CIR) and phase are the most popular channel
parameters used in estimates. More precisely, RSS is the most
common approach because its value is available in all out-
of-the-shelf transceivers on a frame basis hence, dramatically
reducing design and implementation costs. Unfortunately, RSS
values are correlated with distance, and the entropy is greatly
influenced by the mobility of the nodes and intermediate
objects, exposing vulnerabilities against predictive and active
attacks.
Phase [39] [40] and CIR-based approaches [41] [31] [36]
are more resilient to incursions, and able to generate long
secret keys depending on the uniformly distributed nature of
the former, as well as the CSI details were given by the latter.
However, phase and CIR protocols require complex hardware
capabilities which reduce their possible application scenarios.
Following from the fact that the wireless signal behaves
independently in different antennas, in Multiple Input Multiple
Output (MIMO) scenarios the amount of mutual information
is greater than the one in single antenna single frequency
protocols. Therefore it allows improved performance in the
secret key extraction rate [42] [43].
In VANETs, the high-mobility of nodes and the contin-
uous changing of the complex topology make up for RSS
vulnerabilities stated above, especially in a highly-trafficked
urban scenario where multi-path effects dominate the more
predictable line-of-sight component. Following this consider-
ation and the fact that the vast majority of out-of-the-shelf
transmitters have only one available antenna, the present work
will focus on the most representative Single Input Single
Output (SISO) RSS schemes in the literature.
A first technique was presented by Tope et al. [44] based
on the evaluation of signal attenuation caused by multipath
channels extracted from the envelope of received packets.
Let Xk for k = 0, 1...N − 1 be the array of envelope
samples and ∆k the sequence obtained by subtracting half
values from the other half. The quantisation function drops
the estimates that lie outside the two fixed thresholds γl, γh to
avoid measurements with a high probability of disagreement
(∆k < γl) or easily predictable (∆k > γh).
To improve bit agreement rate, in [32] scientists propose
the use of a single threshold to detect deep fades, i.e. local
minima of the wireless signal. An improvement of this work
has been proposed in [41] where Mathur et al. give a detailed
analysis of quantisation parameters. The lossy quantisation
is based on two thresholds q+, q− calculated using average
and standard deviations of estimates, which are previously
removed of slowly changing RSS variations by subtracting
a running average.
Both communicating parties search their estimates for all
excursions above q+ and below q− that last at least for
m > 0 time slots and agree with the counterpart on a list
of corresponding indices which will be used for the final
key extraction. Thresholds levels and minimum excursion
parameter m should be chosen accordingly considering the
expected probability of key disagreement, as well as the key
generation rate.
In [45] Jana et al. improve the previous scheme introducing
an algorithm named Adaptive Secret Bit Generation (ASBG)
where thresholds are dynamic and locally calculated in every
block of estimates of a configurable size. Multi-level quanti-
sation is applied to all measurements. However, the number
of bits per estimate N is severely constrained by noise. In
[46], authors improved further their analysis exploring the
key generation possibilities offered by multiple input multiple
output (MIMO) contexts.
In [47] researchers introduce a lossless quantisation scheme
employing a least-square polynomial curve as the threshold
and a neural-network-based information reconciliation. Simu-
lations suggest that even a small polynomial’s degree lead to
high-level crossing rate (LCR) in both Richian and Rayleigh
fading models.
A first attempt to mitigate imperfect reciprocity is intro-
duced with HRUBE [29] which interpolates channel measure-
ments to consider them as retrieved at the same time instant.
Furthermore, the algorithm uses Karhunen-Loe`ve Transform
(KLT) to obtain vectors with uncorrelated components. The
adaptive ranking-based uncorrelated bit extraction protocol
(ARUBE) has been proposed in [48] as an improvement over
HRUBE, based on a ranking method which both makes the
scheme independent of the specific fading distribution and
normalises the scale of signal powers due to different hardware
characteristics.
Fading trends as quantisation input are evaluated in [28]
where the assumption is that legitimate parties are more likely
to agree on positive or negative RSS trends instead of absolute
values. Trends are directly converted into bit-streams using
their variations’ polarity while other estimates are quantised
through a standard multi-level scheme.
In [37] Aono et al. make use of an electronically steerable
parasitic array radiator (ESPAR) antenna to create artificial
randomness of channel’s measurements. Sequences of esti-
mates contain K + α items, where K is the desired key
length and α addresses imperfect reciprocity. Disagreement
is reduced by considering sub-sequences composed of highest
and lowest values which are then losslessly quantised using
the median value as the unique threshold. An improvement of
this scheme is shown in [49] with the application of an RSS-
interleaving technique which randomises and strengthens the
keys.
A modified version of Mathur et al. lossy scheme is pro-
posed in [17] where m consecutive excursions need not be on
the same side (either below the lower threshold or above higher
threshold). Despite being more influenced by sharp magnitude
changes, resulting bit-streams are the direct concatenation of
whole quantised excursions instead of considering only the
exchanged indices, as in the inspiring protocol.
III. QUANTISATION PERFORMANCE METRICS
The quantisation schemes in literature are evaluated under
many performance metrics, for example, the ease of imple-
mentation translates in a reduction of deployment costs, while
the scalability of the protocol determines to what extent the
algorithm is adaptable to a larger group of nodes. However,
the fundamental metrics are the randomness or the entropy of
the key, the bit generation rate (BGR) and the bit mismatch
rate (BMR).
A. Randomness or entropy of the key
Similar to any conventional cryptographic method, in phys-
ical layer security algorithms the key must not have any
statistical defects in order to maximise the uncertainty from
eavesdropper’s point of view. Given a key of length N , the
associated entropy is defined as follows:
H =
N∑
i=0
−p0,ilogp0,i − (1− p0,i)log(1− p0,i)
where p0,i is the probability of bit i being 0.
Therefore, the key must expose properties that a truly
random sequence would probably exhibit as expressed in
[50]. Even if there are infinite statistic properties of random
sequences, a finite subset of fifteen tests is provided by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [51].
That aims to verify different aspects, such as the frequency
of 0s and 1s, the frequency of longer runs, periodic features,
etc. Some tests require a certain sequence of the length
outside the magnitude of a key generation system, so they
are merely avoided. In the key generation process, there is a
privacy amplification stage whose objective is to improve key
randomness.
B. Bit mismatch rate
The bit mismatch rate (BMR) is an evaluation parameter
strictly correlated to the quantisation step (for example to
the number of its levels), and it is defined as the ratio of
mismatch bits between Alice and Bob to the total number of
quantised bits. Low levels of BMR confirm the resilience of
the quantisation scheme against the noise and the asymmetric
differences of the channel. On the contrary, high BMRs could
significantly influence the overall performance of the systems
since a single uncorrectable bit may force the rejection of the
entire sequence and the restart of the full process. In the case
of group key extraction, the total BMR could be either defined
as the average or the maximum BMR from all nodes’ pairs.
C. Bit generation rate
The bit generation rate (BGR) is defined as the number of
secret bits generated per unit time. This metric embraces all
the phases of the extraction process. Hence, it acts as a global
performance indicator. Unfortunately, BGR often depends on
environmental characteristics, such as nodes’ movements and
multipath richness. Higher values of BGR indicate the faster
ability of two nodes of generating a key of the desired length,
therefore improving the efficiency and the security of the
communication.
IV. SIMULATION PARAMETERS AND RESULTS
The first step in creating a realistic simulation for V2x
environments rely on the choice of a channel model capable of
capturing relevant propagation properties [18], and composed
of a discrete set of time-varying and frequency-selective chan-
nel taps. These correspond to resolvable delay paths distributed
according to specific delay and Doppler spectrum [52].
Channel taps are generated as a sum of sinusoids, i.e. multi-
paths echoes unresolvable in delay, whose frequencies and
phases are chosen in a deterministic or random fashion. In
the former, sinusoids’ weights are calculated in a bottom-up
reproducible, yet complex manner, while in the latter, they
are the output of a Monte Carlo process, piloted by the inter-
ested Doppler probability density function [53]. The random
approach provides numerical stability, easy of implementation
and fast computational processing. Therefore, it seems to be
the natural choice in designing accurate, yet straightforward
systems [54].
According to [18], the frequency-time variant channel re-
sponse is
G(f, t) =
L∑
l=1
|αl|exp(jφl)exp(j2pivlt)exp(−j2pifτl)
where L is the number of multipath components, each-one
having a the complex amplitude |αl|exp(jφl) where |αl| is
the magnitude with random phase φl, a delay τl and Doppler
frequency vl.
Considering narrowband frequency-invariant V-V channel
with three-dimensional scattering at both communicating
nodes, the previous equation can be simplified as
GN (t) = G(0, t) =
L∑
l=1
|αl|exp(jφl)exp(j2pivlt)
where the Doppler contributions of transmitter vT,l, receiver
vR,l and scatterers vS,l add up, thus
vl = vT,l + vS,l + vR,l
obtained by the trigonometric projection of their maximum
values vT (R)max, vSmax in respect to azimuth angles αT (R),l
and elevations βT (R),l of both departure (AOD) and arrival
(AOA) of the corresponding multipath echo [18]. Scatterers
are modelled by directly manipulating AOA and AOD angles
α1, α2 of the impacting multipath component, to avoid the
inaccuracies emerging from unrealistic randomisation of scat-
terers’ directions of movement.
As stated in [17], previously introduced parameters are
appropriately chosen to recreate a Rayleigh-modelled envi-
ronment suitable for urban scenarios with heavy scatterers’
influence. As an improvement, the introduction of a line-of-
sight component and the consequential rise of Rician fading
have to be investigated in future efforts, making the model
also adequate for rural and high-ways backgrounds.
The number of multipath components is L = 20 and their
complex amplitudes have a constant magnitude |αl| =
√
2/L
and a uniformly distributed phase φl ∼ U [−pi, pi] as suggests
in [54]. Furthermore, angles of departure (AOD) and arrival
(AOA) are uniformly distributed, thus
αT (R),l ∼ U [AT (R)min, AT (R)max]
βT (R),l ∼ U [BT (R)min, BT (R)max]
α1, α2 ∼ U [−pi, pi]
Scatterers’ speed is randomised following a Weibull dis-
tribution which has been proved to model multipath power
contribution of mobile scatterers [55] adequately.
Probing rate Fp = 1/Tcoh is set to the maximum possible
frequency achievable without introducing statistical defects
in the generated streams, which means estimates have to be
collected from uncorrelated different coherence regions of
duration Tcoh defined as
Tcoh =
c
fc(vTmax + vRmax + 2vSmax)
Considering vTmax = vRmax = vSmax = 30m/s the
maximum probing rate is Fp = 2400Hz.
A. Results
Simulations are composed of several runs of 10.000 es-
timates to stabilise the evaluation metrics. Without consid-
ering any correcting codes at this stage, lossless quantisa-
tion schemes such as [49] seem not to able to generate
zero-disagreement bit-streams. A standard lossy quantisation
scheme defines two thresholds q−, q+ and a quantisation
function Q(·)
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Fig. 1. Key entropies of differently positioned invalid regions.
Q(x) =

1, if x > q+
0, if x < q−
dropped otherwise
Considering a fixed invalid region with size q+− q− = 0.4,
figure 1 reveals that key entropy assumes maximum values
(∼ 0.95) when thresholds are centred on Rayleigh distribution
mean (q+ + q−)/2 = σ
√
pi
2 ∼ 1.2533 where σ = 1 is
the scale parameter. In these conditions, the commonly used
Mathur et al. scheme [41] achieves a bit generation rate of
approximately ∼ 0.2 bits/sample whilst the recent scheme [17]
records ∼ 0.76 bits/sample, however, higher results > 0.8 are
achievable sacrificing key robustness. Unsurprisingly, a wider
invalid region implies a reduction of both BMR and BGR,
justified by the smaller probability of bit disagreement and
the increased number of dropped values, respectively.
Thresholds can be statistically computed by means of aver-
age µ and standard deviation σ, as follows
q+ = µ(hˆ) + α · σ(hˆ)
q− = µ(hˆ)− α · σ(hˆ)
where hˆ is the array of estimates. Thresholds are refreshed
every |hˆ| = 10 coherence intervals in response to the un-
predictable stationarity region of VANETs [18]. Parameter α
determines the influence of standard deviations in computing
thresholds’ distance: lower α values increase BGR but also
increase BMR. Evaluations showed an optimal value α = 0.3
(see figure 2) achieving a throughput of ∼ 0.85 bits / sample,
a small yet significant improvement over the previous fixed
thresholding strategy. However, considering a key length of
128bits and transmission rate of 300 packets per second [24],
the examined protocols can generate a shared secret key in
about a second, which is insufficient for the low latency
required in safety-related VANETs applications.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced vehicular communication properties and
security constraints and analysed the possible solution offered
by the physical layer key generation approach. RSS-based
schemes are attractive due to their ease of implementation
on off-of-shelf devices and because key entropy is highly
correlated to wireless nodes mobility, which is the fundamental
characteristic of VANETs.
Extensive simulations have been evaluated to test the most
representative protocols against a stochastic V-V channel
model which consider three dimensional scattering and scatters
mobility. Besides the increasing performances of recent proto-
cols, they still need to improve bit generation rate to provide
a sufficiently fast key agreement for low-latency safety-related
services and keep an high level of entropy to guarantee
statistical resilience.
Future studies should investigate in depth the possibility
of creating a quantisation scheme which better suits the
referenced stochastic V-V model and its peculiar properties,
for example by adapting the probing rate, the number and the
tolerances of quantisation bins, in response to sharp changes
in channel variability caused by transmitter, receiver and
scatterers mobility.
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